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Abstract
As the understanding of the importance of social contact networks in the spread of infectious
diseases has increased, so has the interest in understanding the feedback process of the disease
altering the social network. While many studies have explored the influence of individual epidemi-
ological parameters and/or underlying network topologies on the resulting disease dynamics, we
here provide a systematic overview of the interactions between these two influences on population-
level disease outcomes. We show that the sensitivity of the population-level disease outcomes to
the combination of epidemiological parameters that describe the disease are critically dependent
on the topological structure of the population’s contact network. We introduce a new metric for
assessing disease-driven structural damage to a network as a population-level outcome. Lastly,
we discuss how the expected individual-level disease burden is influenced by the complete suite
of epidemiological characteristics for the circulating disease and the ongoing process of network
compromise. Our results have broad implications for prediction and mitigation of outbreaks in
both natural and human populations.
PACS numbers:
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INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in our understanding of complex social structures have led to a re-
evaluation of epidemiological processes taking place on these structures [1–8]. Almost all
infection models have been shown to behave differently on complex networks compared to
simple lattice structures or to fully mixed models [9, 10], reflecting different potential types
of contact patterns among various populations [11–14]. Typical epidemiological models [15]
include variations of the basic SI, SIR, and SIS models, where susceptible (S) individuals
can become infected (I) upon encounter with other infected individuals and eventually either
recover with immunity (R-state where they cannot be re-infected) or without immunity (i.e.
return to the susceptible state). Each of these models is appropriate to describe varying
conditions of spreading.
Thus far, however, no network-based analysis has considered cases in which the disease
both generates a limited-duration immunity that eventually lapses back into susceptibility
(due either to genetic drift, including antigenic drift [16] of the pathogen or to loss of T-cell
memory [17], while also carrying a non-trivial risk of disease-induced mortality [18]. While
both of these examples focus on influenza virus [19, 20], many pathogens exhibit this pattern
of generation of immunity that later wanes.
Explicit study of such a case may, in fact, be of particular practical importance since both
disease-related death and temporary immunity will interrupt successful disease transmission
over the remaining network. The dynamics between permanent removal (i.e. death) and
the temporary removal (i.e. immunity) may drive the emergence of very different global
patterns in disease outcomes.
As has been well-studied [21–23], the interplay between the network structure and the
dynamic spreading process strongly influences the outcomes of an epidemic. In lattice struc-
tures, all nodes have a similar importance to disease risk and spread because of the spatial
invariance and the homogeneous character of the system, so that these effects do not exist. In
contrast, in complex network the structure is dominated by the existence of well-connected
hubs. These nodes are included in the majority of all possible paths, so that a disease can
easily reach them. Even nodes that are not well-connected can become very significant in
spreading if they happen to be in an appropriate location [24]. Of course, for pathogens
that carries a non-trivial mortality risk, frequent infection of a node in any network will
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eventually lead to its removal. This removal greatly impacts the structural features of the
remaining network. The topology becomes more hostile to spreading and areas that were
easily connected through the hubs can now become protected by the disease simply by iso-
lation. This isolation, though, can have detrimental effects on proper communication in
the network. In short, the interplay between the exposure of nodes to infection and their
asymmetrical impact of removal on both topology and dynamics, creates a complex cycle
with unusual epidemiological properties.
Disease-induced mortality itself may be especially important to consider when non-
disease-related processes of network function may be drastically diminished by disease-
induced structural compromise, even though exactly such disconnection acts to diminish
the probability of transmission of future infection for the remaining nodes (by decreasing
effective population density) [25]. In these cases, some standard measures of structural
integrity of the population may seem uncompromised (e.g. largest remaining connected
component) [26], even though function can be reduced to the point of failure (e.g. increased
average minimal path lengths for communication between individuals in the population)
[27]. To study these types of functional effects, we introduce a new measure, the stability
index, which can take into account partial structure compromise as a result of an infectious
epidemic with an associated mortality risk. This consideration may be useful in fields such
as conservation biology or communication networks.
METHODS
The SIRDS model.
We model the spreading of a potentially fatal epidemic disease in a population. Recovery
from the disease provides short-term immunity [28]. The disease originates in a randomly
selected node (then automatically designated in the infected class, I) in an otherwise fully
susceptible population, S. In every time-step, all the susceptible neighbors of the infected
nodes become infected with probability β per infected neighbor. After attempting to infect
their neighbors, the infected nodes leave the I class at a recovery rate γ. These nodes
either die with probability f , so that they fall in the D (Deceased), or recover into the R
(Recovered) class with probability 1 − f . Nodes in recovery are immune-protected, losing
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that protection at a rate r, the rate of loss of protection. The number of surviving nodes in
this model is a function of time, N(t), with the initial population being N(0) = N nodes.
We describe this SIRDS process in Fig. 1. The equations that describe this model are:
S˙ = −βSI + rR (1)
I˙ = βSI − γI (2)
D˙ = γfI (3)
R˙ = (1− f)γI − rR (4)
N(t) = S(t) + I(t) +R(t) = 1−D(t) (5)
DeadRecovering
Susceptible Infected
1-
FIG. 1: Schematic of the SIRDS process.
The mortality probability, f , determines what percentage of the infected population will
leave the system. The two limiting cases of the SIRDS model correspond to a simple SIR
model, when f = 1, and to an SIRS model, when f = 0. There are no ongoing demographic
processes, such as natural births or natural deaths in the model, so death results only as an
outcome of the modeled disease. We fix the rate γ to γ = 1, which also fixes the time-scale
of the system so that our time unit throughout the simulations is equal to the recovery time.
In the following, we study the effect of the remaining parameters in the system, infection
probability, β, mortality probability, f , and protection loss rate, r.
The main quantity of interest in our current study is the mass of dead individuals, D,
and the conditions which determine its asymptotic, D(∞), and finite-time value, D(t). We
will use this quantity to further estimate the probability that the population will retain its
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long-range connectivity. This is a measure of the viability of the population and its ability
to survive against spreading of fatal infections.
Network structure.
We study the SIRDS process on two typical structures for the initial population con-
nectivity: a square two-dimensional lattice and a scale-free network. We further split the
scale-free network examples into two cases: a) random scale-free networks, which have been
used to describe large-scale human populations [29], and b) self-organized networks, which
may be more reflective of emergent structures in many natural populations [30]. In all cases,
we study small networks of size N = 200, compromising between an accurate order of mag-
nitude for many natural populations of concern for ongoing persistence and sufficiency of
size to enable meaningful computational observations. We have also verified that the results
are not significantly influenced when we increased the size to N = 1000 (see e.g. Fig. 2).
The random scale-free networks are created by the configuration model [31], with a power-
law degree distribution of exponent λ = 2.5, i.e. P (k) ∼ k−2.5. In this structure most nodes
have a low degree but the hubs are quite strong, with each hub connected to roughly 5-30%
of the network.
The self-organized networks describe a different social organization, where a few nodes
act as super-hubs and are connected to almost every other node in the system [30]. This
simulates a strongly hierarchical society, where a few ‘alpha’ animals dominate over the
entire group (e.g. grooming behaviors in primates, [32]). We chose the model parameters
so that we remain consistent with previous research on such structures [30]. This network
is built as follows: All nodes start with an initial degree k = 5, with 5 randomly selected
nodes as neighbors. We assume that the nodes evolve their connections, with the goal of
connecting to the most-connected nodes. Therefore, at each step all nodes remove their
two neighbors with the smallest degree and create new links towards two randomly selected
nodes. In this way, the nodes preferentially attach themselves to the largest hubs, which
become progressively larger until at the end they are connected to almost the entire network.
We use this final form of the network as the static representation of connectivity, and we
apply the SIRDS process on this structure.
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Survival probability.
We characterize the survival of nodes through the survival probability, Φ. Here, Φ is
defined as the probability that a node that is alive at the present state of the spreading
process will remain alive until the disease has died out. We consider this property to be
a function of either time, Φ(t), or of the percentage of removed nodes, Φ(p). These two
parameters describe the state of the network, from a different perspective. The first pa-
rameter is the number of steps, t, since the beginning of infection, and this measure can be
useful to determine how much time is available to intervene, independently of the current
network damage. The second parameter is the fraction p of the initial network that has
been removed due to the disease, independently of the time required to reach this level of
damage. In practice, we quantify the evolution of the survival probability by the point t0.9
or p0.9 when Φ first becomes equal or larger to 90%, Φ > 0.9, i.e. after the point where more
than 90% of the remaining nodes will eventually survive.
Robustness.
The resilience of a network with regards to node removal is typically measured through
the size of the largest cluster remaining, Smax, compared to the size of the largest cluster
before removing any nodes [33]. The connectedness of a cluster does not guarantee, though,
the efficient operation of the network. For example, the fact that one node can still reach
another node may not be as important as the fact that the path length between two nodes has
increased so much that it is no longer meaningful to consider the two nodes reachable from
each other. This behavior has been described by the concept of limited path percolation
(LPP) [34]. In LPP, two nodes which are originally at distance ℓij from each other are
considered to be connected after the attack only if their new distance is smaller than aℓij.
The parameter a indicates our tolerance of the communication distance. A value of a = 1
requires that the original distances remain intact for the nodes to be considered connected,
while a =∞ implies that the distances are no longer important and this case coincides with
the typical identification of the largest connected component.
Here, we suggest a combination of two separate ideas to describe the efficiency of the re-
maining connected cluster. First, instead of using the fraction of nodes in the largest cluster,
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we calculate the area under the dynamic calculation of this fraction
∫ pmax
0
Smax(a)dp. This
method has been introduced to estimate the efficiency of an attack strategy, independently
of the final value Smax [34]. A key point in our method is that the evolution of the node
removal is not described by time, for example by the number of steps. Instead, we use the
fraction of removed/dead nodes, p, which is a direct result of the disease-induced mortality
process. In this way we can directly compare different processes on different networks when
the same number of nodes has been removed in each case. Another quantity that charac-
terizes the spreading process is the maximum number of nodes that have been removed due
to infection, pmax, until there is no infection in the system. Notice that the largest cluster
does not necessarily vanish at pmax, and this is what separates this index from the unique
robustness measure, introduced in [34]. That definition cannot be applied if the removal
process terminates before the largest cluster vanishes. Additionally, the maximum possible
value for the integral is not necessarily 0.5, and proper normalization needs to take this fact
into account. Therefore, the quantity of interest is the area under the curve of Smax from
p = 0 to pmax. We further normalize this quantity by the area under the case of minimum
possible damage, 1− p, where the only nodes that leave the spanning cluster are those that
have been physically removed. As a result, we define a stability index, B(a), as
B(a) =
∫ pmax
0
Smax(a)dp∫ pmax
0
(1− p)dp
(6)
The limits of this expression are a) B = 1 when the least possible damage has been done
and the only nodes missing from the largest cluster are those that have been removed by the
disease, and b) B = 0 when the largest cluster vanishes immediately after removing a few
nodes. Therefore, the stability index can characterize the extent of damage in the remaining
largest cluster, independently of its final size. The stability index coincides with the unique
robustness measure [34] when pmax = 1 and a = ∞. The second key idea that we use in
this definition comes from the Limited Path Percolation method [27], through the parameter
a. This parameter allows us to characterize the same cluster under varying requirements
for functionality. The typical case where connectivity between any two nodes is enough for
network function, independently of how long the distance between these nodes has become,
is expressed by the value of a =∞. We use this case to normalize the results. The ratio of
B(a)/B(∞) then, indicates our possible error when we decide about the survival of a group
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strictly from the existence of a spanning cluster. An important feature of this error is that it
includes information from the entire process and not only from the final state. For example,
damage at earlier stages leads to a smaller B value.
Computational experiments
We apply the SIRDS model for three different rates of loss of protection, r: r = 0.05,
0.20, and 0.50. Each of these values of r indicates a different duration of immunity for an
already infected node. In the first case, a recovering node remains immune for 20 time steps,
presenting a natural obstacle for spreading over a significant amount of time. In the second
case, immunity lasts for an intermediate interval of 5 steps, while in the latter case the node
becomes susceptible after only 2 steps. We independently vary the probabilities f and β
from 0.05 to 1, in steps of 0.05. For each case we average over 20 different realizations of
the structure. In each realization every node serves as the infection origin 5 times, so that
each point has been averaged over a total of 100,000 simulations of the epidemic process.
For each case we record the fraction of the population, D, that died because of the disease
and the duration of the epidemics, T , defined as the time from the initial infection until
when there is no infected individual. All simulations were run until the infection died
out, independently of the number of steps required to reach this stage or the number of
infected/diseased nodes. The code for the simulation of the SIRDS is freely available at
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~feffermn/code.php.
Parameter ranges were chosen to explore a sufficient diversity of epidemiological charac-
teristics to demonstrate how different diseases may produce substantially different results,
and we recommend that specific analyses for particular diseases make use of rates tailored
to the specific population/network of interest.
Notation
In Table I we summarize the notation that we use throughout the paper:
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Symbol Definition
t Number of time steps in the simulation
S(t) Number of susceptible individuals at time t
I(t) Number of infected individuals at time t
R(t) Number of recovering individuals at time t
D(t) Number of dead individuals at time t
N(t) Number of surviving individuals at time t
β Infection probability
γ Recovery rate
f Probability of death for an infected individual
r Loss of protection rate
T Maximum epidemic duration (time until I(t) = 0)
p Fraction of dead individuals = D(t)/N(0)
pmax Maximum value of p, at t = T
λ Degree exponent for the scale-free networks
Φ(t) Probability for a node to survive until T , given that it is alive at time t
Φ(p) Probability for a node to survive until T , given that p nodes have been removed
t0.9 Number of time steps when the survival prob. first becomes Φ(t) ≥ 0.9
p0.9 Fraction of removed nodes when the survival prob. first becomes Φ(p) ≥ 0.9
Smax Fraction of surviving nodes that form the largest remaining cluster
ℓij Shortest path distance between nodes i and j in the original network
a Nodes are considered disconnected if their distance becomes > aℓij
B(a) Stability index, defined in Eq. 6
TABLE I: Definitions of the main parameters and properties used in the paper.
RESULTS
Fraction of dead population
For a two-dimensional lattice the picture is very similar to what we would expect from a
standard SIR model (Fig. 2, top row). In the SIR model (which corresponds to the SIRDS
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model when f = 1), there is a sharp transition as we increase the infection probability, β,
from a ‘safe’ population with almost no mortality to nearly complete annihilation at β > 0.5.
A similar pattern is observed here in the results for the lattice. The mortality probability,
f , has little influence, as long as it has a value that is not close to 0, e.g. f > 0.1. As we
increase the protection loss rate for the same infection and mortality rates, the influence of
f becomes weaker and a larger part of the population dies: in a faster recovery the nodes
spend more time in the susceptible state where they can be infected rather than in the
recovering state, where they are immune.
The picture is quite different in random scale-free networks (Fig. 2, middle row). The
region of total annihilation is now restricted to high values of both f and β. Here, we
consider the threshold point for epidemics to be the combination of parameters where the
diseased fraction becomes larger than zero, independently of the infected mass. Even though
the threshold for an epidemic outbreak remains close to β = 0.5, the inflicted damage is
considerably smaller than in a lattice. The hubs are connected to a significant fraction of
the network, while the majority of the nodes have very few connections. These conditions
result in efficient protection of the population.
In contrast, the hubs in self-organized networks are much stronger and are connected to
almost all other nodes (Fig. 2, bottom row). This makes the network more vulnerable, even
for low mortality probabilities f . The percolation threshold for β is considerably smaller
than in lattices and scale-free networks. The threshold value is now close to β = 0.1, which
indicates that it is much easier for epidemics to occur because of the extremely centralized
nature of the network. Moreover, similar results are obtained even when f is very low, in
particular for large protection loss rates, r. Indicatively, when β = 0.3 and f = 0.3 at
r = 0.50 the infection leaves almost 55% of the population dead, while the corresponding
fraction in scale-free networks is around 6% and in lattices it is 0.3%. These differences
point out the different structural character of each system and its influence on mortality due
to epidemic spreading.
The influence of the protection loss rate r on the results is mainly quantitative. The
behavior of the dead fraction does not change a lot as we increase the rate of protection loss
for the same structure, and the general features that we find in the plots for small r also
apply to those of large r. In the following sections, we also find that r mainly influences the
numerical values of the epidemic duration and the survival probability, but has otherwise a
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FIG. 2: Fraction of the population that died because of the disease, as a function of
the infection probability and the death probability. From top to bottom: two-dimensional
lattices, random scale-free networks (λ = 2.5), and self-organized networks. The x-axis corresponds
to the infection probability, β, and the y-axis to the death probability, f , of an infected node. The
columns correspond to the protection loss rate, r, of a node (left to right): r = 0.05 (N = 1000), r =
0.05 (N = 200), r = 0.20, and r = 0.50. The threshold point for a given combination of parameters
is defined as the point where the diseased fraction becomes larger than zero, independently of the
infected mass. In the plots, the threshold values for each case can be found at the point where the
blue area turns into green.
limited effect.
Duration of outbreak
An important feature of the spreading process is the duration of the epidemics. A longer
duration leaves a much larger time window for possible intervention, while a shorter duration
may complete the maximum spreading cycle before any action can be taken. In lattices, the
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duration is dictated by the value of β and is almost independent of f , except for large β and
small f values where we observe somewhat longer durations (Fig. 3, top row). This is in
contrast to scale-free networks (Fig. 3, middle row), where three regimes are found: a) low-
β regime: the disease lasts only for a couple of steps and dies rapidly without causing any
damage, b) intermediate-to-large β regime and large f values: the duration of the epidemics
in the N = 200 network is of the order of 10 steps. Even though the duration is small,
the damage is considerable, and c) intermediate-to-large β regime and small f values: the
epidemics now can last for more than 100 steps, even though it is not as lethal as the previous
case. In self-organized networks (Fig. 3, bottom row) the picture is basically the same as in
scale-free networks, but now the epidemics may spread extremely fast even at large values
of β. Interestingly, even though the duration may change by an order of magnitude as we
vary the mortality probability, the end result is always a large fraction of the population
dying (from 75-100%).
Classification of the outbreak
Figs. 2 and 3 suggest the existence of roughly four regimes for the corresponding proba-
bilities: a) Low mortality – Low infectivity, b) Low mortality – Large infectivity, c) Large
mortality – Low infectivity, and d) Large mortality – Large infectivity. Lattices and scale-
free networks are quite similar qualitatively in all these regimes, with large damage when
both β and f are large. The distinguishing feature of self-organized networks is that the
dead fraction can be very large when only one of the two basic parameters, β or f , is large,
even if the other one remains relatively small.
In Fig. 4 we combine both the extent of damage and the outbreak duration. For every
pair of β and f parameters we assign a color depending on whether more than half of the
population died because of the disease and whether the outbreak lasted more or less than
10 steps. In this way, there are four possible classifications of short/long duration combined
with large/small damage. Notice that the duration of the epidemic is only determined by
the number of steps until there is no infected node. A long or short duration is possible even
if the end result of a spreading process is that there are no diseased nodes.
The case of smallest damage is when the dead fraction is low and the disease dies out
quickly (blue color in the plots). A trivial result is that this behavior dominates when β is
12
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FIG. 3: Duration of epidemic: time till stochastic die-out. From top to bottom: two-
dimensional lattices, random scale-free networks (λ = 2.5), and self-organized networks. The
x-axis corresponds to the infection probability, β, and the y-axis to the death probability, f , of
an infected node. The columns correspond to the protection loss rate, r, of a node (left to right):
r = 0.05, r = 0.20, and r = 0.50.
very small, independently of the value of f , because a low infection probability drastically
limits the infection spread from the node of initial disease introduction.
In lattices, the process evolves slowly, except when there is little to no node removal.
This long duration can lead either to extended damage (yellow areas) for large β and f
values or to limited damage (green areas) when f is smaller. Lattices never exhibit short
duration/extended damage combination (red areas) under any combination of parameters,
which is the result of the extended spatial distances from the absence of hubs in the structure.
Interestingly, in scale-free networks the dominant area of short duration/little damage
extends over much larger values of β, as a result of the small damage in general, showing
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FIG. 4: Combination of the results on dead population and duration. The color in the
plots, as explained in the index, indicates whether the infection destroyed more or less than half
the population and whether it lasted more or less than 10 steps. Red and yellow indicate the areas
of larger damage.
an alternative behavior only under large β and f values (Fig. 2). The case of long duration
with extended damage only emerges in a narrow range of very large infection probabilities
and moderate mortality rates in scale free networks. This shows that for scale-free networks
extended damage occurs very rapidly, and only for large values of β and f . Otherwise, the
infection either dies out quickly or is not able to destroy a significant part of the network.
In self-organized networks, the hubs strongly dominate the structure and create a much
smaller-world. This leads to a generally short duration. For small protection loss rates,
r = 0.05, the short duration/little damage area dominates the plot, showing extended
damage only when mortality rates are extremely high. For higher protection loss rates,
a longer duration was observed for small mortality rates, f , which switched from small
damage to higher damage as we moved from r = 0.2 to r = 0.5.
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The survival probability
The survival probability of a node increases, for the most part monotonically, both with
time and p. This is the expected behavior: as time passes, a larger number of nodes die
and the network becomes increasingly sparse. Large parts of the network are effectively
isolated from the disease, so that the remaining nodes are less exposed to further infections.
In Figs. 5a and 5b we compare the survival probability Φ for different topologies. We can
see that in lattices, for example, the survival probability Φ(t) increases at a slower rate than
in (e.g.) self-organized networks. This indicates that if we focus on the duration of the
epidemics only, a node in a lattice remains potentially vulnerable to infections for a longer
time. In self-organized networks this process is much more rapid. On the other side, when
we consider Φ(p) as a function of the percentage of removed nodes, it takes a much larger
number of removals for a node in self-organized networks to start feeling ‘safer’.
The results for the t0.9 and p0.9 points are shown in Figs. 5c and 5d for all combinations
of the model parameters, r, β, and f . It is possible that the epidemic never kills more than
10% of the population, in which case t0.9 = 0, and there is no time when the probability of
survival is less than 90%. When the final percentage of the dying population is more than
90%, then the corresponding tipping point t0.9 becomes infinite, i.e. it is certain that all
nodes will die. This case appears only for f = 1 and large values of β.
The values of t0.9 are 0 for small values of β, practically independently of the values of
f . Other than that, the influence of the infection probability β is much weaker than the
mortality rate f . Large values of f result in small values for t0.9, i.e. there is very little
time until a node can feel safe. At small values of f , though, this time becomes orders of
magnitude larger, and it may take more than 200 steps until the survival probability reaches
90%. The results are rather similar among the studied topologies.
When we consider Φ(p), instead, the topology has a greater influence on the results. For
the square lattice, the point p0.9 is close to p0.9 = 1 when both β and f are large. When f is
small this value is closer to p0.9 = 0.5, and vanishes for small β. In self-organized networks,
p0.9 = 1 for large β values but now f is small. When f is larger, then this value drops to
p0.9 ∼ 0.8. When β is small, the influence of f is negligible, but the values of p0.9 ∼ 0.25 are
significantly higher than in the case of lattices (p0.9 ∼ 0).
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FIG. 5: Survival probability. (a) Average survival probability for a node that has survived after
t steps as a function of t. The lines correspond to the three different topologies, for a given set
of parameter simulations. (b) Average survival probability for a node that has survived after a
fraction, p, of nodes has died of the disease. (c) The time t0.9 for different parameters r, f , and
β. (d) The fraction p0.9 for different parameters r, f , and β. Combination of the results on dead
population and duration.
Functional impact to structure from disease-induced mortality
Having established how epidemics of this type function over the network structures that
we study, we turn our attention into the real damage done by the infection. The end fraction
of dead individuals is an indication of what part of the social structure has survived, but
the most important quantity for functional purposes is the connectivity of the remaining
network. Typically, this is described through the size of the largest remaining cluster, Smax.
However, as mentioned in the Methods section, it is possible that the remaining cluster is
connected but the distances are so large that communication in the network may no longer
function properly.
Compared to other robustness measures, such as e.g. the largest cluster size or the
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unique robustness measure, the use of the stability index offers two main advantages,: a) it
can measure the structural damage even if the disease has not eliminated the largest cluster
(integral calculated up to pmax), and b) the extent of damage can reflect our tolerance for
the spatial expansion of communication lengths.
In scale-free networks (Fig. 6b), an increase of either the infection probability or the
mortality rate leads to a rapid decrease of the stability index from B(∞) ∼ 1 to B(∞) ∼ 0.5.
In self-organized networks, though, the variation of the infection probability does not have
the same impact as the mortality rate. These networks are found to be more robust than the
random scale-free networks, even though under the same conditions they lose more nodes
due to disease-induced deaths (Fig. 2). We repeated the same set of simulations for the
case of a = 1.5, i.e. two nodes are not considered connected if their distance exceeds 1.5
times their distance in the original network. In this case (Fig. 6b, bottom) the dependence
on β and f remained qualitatively the same, but now the values of the stability index were
considerably lower.
We quantified this significant variation of the stability index, B(a), with decreasing a
(Fig. 6c) by comparing the ratio of the stability index B(∞)/B(a = 1.5) for pairs of (β, f).
The differences are relatively small for small infection probabilities β, but they increase as
we increase β and become more prominent as we increase f . In the most extreme case, the
ratio has a value of 1.5, which means that we over-estimate the probability of the network
remaining connected by a factor of 50%. This can be crucial in border-line cases, where
the existence of a connecting cluster would signal the survival of a group, but in practice
the extended damage leads to long connectivity paths that render communication difficult
or impossible. The curves reach a maximum value (i.e. maximum error) for values of β in
the range of 0.4-0.5, indicating that the error diminishes for higher infection probabilities,
where typically epidemics spread over the entire population.
DISCUSSION
Disease-induced mortality models can lead to a rapid extinction of the underlying popu-
lation, but the conditions required for this may be far from trivial. In particular, a scale-free
network topology may accelerate spreading but it also limits the extent of the area that is
susceptible to infection. These conflicting factors can be traced to the effect of the hubs,
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FIG. 6: Structural impact of the epidemic process. (a) Calculation of the quantity B(a).
For a given value of a we calculate the ratio of the area under the Smax curve over the area under
the case of least possible damage 1 − p. (b) The values of B(a), calculated in scale-free and self-
organized networks, as a function of β and f . The top two rows correspond to a = ∞, and the
bottom two rows to a = 1.5. (c) Comparison of the structural damage measured through the
largest cluster size (a = ∞) vs the damage measured through limited-path-percolation (a = 1.5).
The ratio indicates that the largest cluster may overestimate the robustness of the social structure
by a factor of up to 1.5.
which can easily reach different parts of the network. However, if a hub remains immune or
removed because of the disease it facilitates disease isolation and communication between
different network areas becomes much more difficult. Contrary to intuition, extensive dam-
age in scale-free networks occurred only for very high probabilities of infection and mortality.
When the hubs become extremely dominant, such as in self-organized networks, then the
dominant parameter is the infection probability rather than the mortality rate. Even small
mortality rates can lead to network destruction, as long as the infection probability remains
high and preserves the infection in the system.
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We see, then, that the impact of the hubs is not as straightforward as intuition may
suggest from their role of bringing all network nodes closer to each other. All the nodes
in lattices are equivalent, but the fraction of removed nodes is systematically higher than
in scale-free networks, under the same simulation conditions. The epidemics duration in
lattices is, of course, much longer because of their large-world character. Despite these
differences, the survival probability is comparable in both cases, and a node can feel ‘safe’
from removal after surviving roughly 10 steps.
The fate of the infection spreading depends on the interplay between the model param-
eters r, f , and β and the structure itself. In general, small protection loss rates, r, protect
nodes by providing temporary immunity and possibly allowing the infection to be removed
from their neighborhood. However, this change is mainly quantitative, while qualitatively
the behavior remains similar as we increase r. Unsurprisingly, the main drivers of the epi-
demics are β and f . Obviously, when both the infection probability and the mortality
rate are high, the infection quickly eliminates the majority of the system. Critically, when
only one of these parameters is large or if their values are relatively high, though, then the
behavior largely depends on the structure. For example, a small infection probability in
lattices prevents extensive mortality even if f is large. In self-organized networks we find
the opposite picture, where β does not influence the outcome but a large mortality rate leads
to extended node removal. These outcomes reveal a much more complicated and nuanced
dynamic for the spread of infectious diseases in network-structured populations than have
previously been explored. This suggests that many of the results in the literature, which
have been assumed to apply generally to a diversity of diseases and a range of qualitatively
similar network structures, may actually apply only more narrowly to certain ranges of
combinations of those descriptors.
We also found that if we quantify network robustness based on the size of the largest
cluster only, we may over-estimate the efficiency of the network by a factor of 50%. The
natural conclusion is that survival of a connected structure does not necessarily mean that
the functionality remains intact, and depending on the communication requirements the
network may have already stopped functioning as intended. To address this, we introduced
the stability index suitable for describing the extent of structural damage during a spreading
process. The index can quantify the efficiency of communication in the resulting disease-
affected structure by going beyond the existence of the connected cluster, and taking into
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account the increase in path lengths. This index incorporates information both from the
path lengths and the dynamics of the spread of the disease. As such, it offers many distinct
advantages: a) we do not assess the damage by a binary measure, i.e. the existence or
not of a spanning cluster, b) the stability index can be readily compared across different
networks, since it considers the damage up to the point where the infection dies out, c) the
index takes into account the removal history, so that damage done at earlier stages leads to
smaller indexes, and d) the structural damage is evaluated according to the loss of paths, so
that differences in clusters with the same number of nodes are still captured by the index.
This study demonstrates the effect of disease-induced mortality in a population, assum-
ing it undergoes one epidemic outbreak that leaves the network weakened, compared to
its initial state. Subsequent outbreaks can accumulate additional damage on the network
robustness, but now spreading starts in a different initial structure. This results to a huge
amount of possible combinations (the second disease may have different features than the
first). The susceptibility of the resulting networks can be indirectly found by using the
results presented above to apply the same process to the damaged network, instead of the
unperturbed structure. We plan to study the effect of repeated epidemics in a future work.
These results imply that very specific scenarios may offer greater protection from out-
breaks that could otherwise compromise populations. This conclusion may be of special
concern in the context of (re)emerging zoonotic infections where populations from multiple
host species may be affected in different ways due to differences in physiological responses
to infection. Patterns in the species-to-species paths by which zoonotic diseases reach hu-
man populations are dependent on the survival of infected animal populations at levels that
permit continued circulation of disease for long enough to interact with humans (or at least
other intermediate animal hosts) to enable transmission. Such patterns are critical to the
metapopulation dynamics in the ecology of infectious diseases [35, 36], and the models here
presented provide greater insights into the driving forces that may produce these patterns in
ways that have gone as yet unexplored. In this way, we may provide an otherwise-missing el-
ement needed to estimate zoonotic risks based on the interaction of epidemiology and social
behavior in the reservoir species involved.
Our investigations show nontrivial interactions among the parameters of transmission and
mortality risks and the network structure in a more nuanced way than is usually described
when studying disease spread on networks. Additionally, the stability metric presented ex-
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tends our ability to quantify the expected practical outcomes to populations experiencing
outbreaks beyond the traditional measures to include plausibility of communication, rather
than just possibility of communication. Together, these types of analyses over both epidemi-
ological and topological variations increase our understanding of the extent and timing of
population vulnerability to outbreaks of infectious diseases.
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